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We present an analysis of oil prices in US$ and in other major currencies that diagnoses unsus-
tainable faster-than-exponential behavior. This supports the hypothesis that the recent oil price
run-up has been amplified by speculative behavior of the type found during a bubble-like expansion.
We also attempt to unravel the information hidden in the oil supply-demand data reported by two
leading agencies, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy
Agency (IEA). We suggest that the found increasing discrepancy between the EIA and IEA figures
provides a measure of the estimation errors. Rather than a clear transition to a supply restricted
regime, we interpret the discrepancy between the IEA and EIA as a signature of uncertainty, and
there is no better fuel than uncertainty to promote speculation!
PACS numbers:
Since 1995, the US markets have lived through
three major episodes, now recognized by most profes-
sionals and regulators and a growing number of aca-
demics as bubbles: the new economy ICT (Internet-
Communication-Technology) frenzy culminating in 2000,
the real-estate surge peaking in the US in mid-2006 and
the subprime NIV (new instrument vehicle) boom, which
topped in 2007. In finance and economics, the term bub-
ble refers to a situation in which excessive expectations
of future price increases cause prices to be temporarily el-
evated without justification from fundamental valuation.
Since approximately March 2008, a growing number of
journalists, pundits [1], bankers [2] and academics [3, 4]
have been discussing the pros and cons of the hypothesis
that commodities, and in particular oil, have entered a
bubble regime. One key question is to explain the qua-
drupling of oil prices since 2003. Some attribute it mainly
to the pricing of the growing demand (in particular from
the emergent China and India markets) imperfectly bal-
anced by the increasingly apparent limits of world oil
production. Others are raising the specter of rising spec-
ulation [1].
Based on analogies with statistical physics and com-
plexity theory, we have developed in the last decade
an approach that diagnoses bubbles as transient super-
exponential regimes [5]. In a nutshell, our methodol-
ogy aims at detecting the transient phases where posi-
tive feedbacks operating on some markets or asset classes
create local unsustainable price run-ups. The mathemat-
ical signature of these bubbles is a log-periodic power
law (LPPL) [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. The power law models
the faster-than-exponential growth culminating in finite
time. The log-periodic oscillations reflect hierarchical
structures [8, 9] as well as competition between the trad-
ing dynamics of fundamental value and momentum in-
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FIG. 1: Typical result of the calibration of the simple LPPL
model to the oil price in US$ in shrinking windows with start-
ing dates tstart moving up towards the common last date
tlast = May 27, 2008.
vestors [11].
Here, we present a brief synopsis of an extended anal-
ysis that we have performed to address the question of
whether oil prices exhibit a bubble-like dynamics, which
may be symptomatic of speculative behavior. We have
obtained robust and reliable diagnostics (i) by compar-
ing different implementations of the LPPL theory, called
the simple LPPL model [10], the second-order Weier-
strass model [12] and the second-order Landau model
[13, 14, 15], (ii) by performing extensive sensitivity anal-
yses with respect to many different time windows used to
calibrate the models and (iii) by using bootstrap meth-
ods to resample the residues over monthly time scales so
as to keep as much as possible the statistical properties
2of the time series in the bootstrap scenarios. In our de-
tailed analysis, we condition the calibration on a certain
number of additional constraints that ensure the statis-
tical significance of the LPPL structure, which include
bounds on the key parameters informed from previous
analyses [10, 16], and the statistical significance of the
power law and log-periodic components [17]. In addition,
to address the question of a possible interplay between
oil price increase and US-dollar depreciation, we perform
the same analysis for oil price expressed in euro and in
other major currencies.
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Jan08
Apr08
Jul08
Oct08
Jan09
Apr09
Jul09
t_{start}
tc
 
 simple LPPL
2nd−order Weierstrass
2nd−order Landau
FIG. 2: Predicted critical time tc obtained using the three
LPPL models (simple LPPL, second-order Weierstrass and
second-order Landau) as a function of the beginning time
tstart for the fixed tlast = May 27, 2008.
Figure 1 shows a typical result of the calibration of the
simple LPPL model to the oil price in US$ in shrinking
windows with starting dates tstart moving up towards the
common last date tlast = May 27, 2008. One particular
useful feature of the LPPL models is that, in contrast
with most econometric models, they describe transient
regimes ending at a critical time tc beyond which the
bubble is supposed to cross-over to another regime, ei-
ther by crashing or through a more progressive transi-
tion [16, 18]. Figure 2 shows the predicted critical time
tc obtained using the three LPPL models (simple LPPL,
second-order Weierstrass and second-order Landau) as a
function of the beginning time tstart for the fixed tlast =
May 27, 2008. Extensive scanning of tstart and tlast con-
firms the main messages of figures 1 and 2 of (a) a reliable
detection of a LPPL regime confirming the existence of a
bubble in oil price expressed in US$ and (b) a robust and
stable diagnostic that the bubble is close to a local peak
(and actually may have already reached it). We cannot
however exclude the possibility that the proximity to a
critical time tc is only a temporary process embedded in
a larger-scale bubble, that could develop in the coming
months and years.
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FIG. 3: Three fits with the simple LPPL, second-order Weier-
strass and second-order Landau model of the oil price ex-
pressed in euro.
Figure 3 shows the three fits with the simple
LPPL, second-order Weierstrass and second-order Lan-
dau model of the oil price expressed in euro. This con-
firms that the bubble is genuine, and not solely a conse-
quence of the weakening of the US$. The values of the
critical time tc determined from these and other calibra-
tions in different time windows and using other major
currencies are found similar to those reported in figure 2,
confirming the existence of a bubble phenomenon. In ad-
dition, our analysis points to a distinct change of regime
in the oil price dynamics in US$ occurring between the
last quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006, beyond
which a net acceleration can be observed, perhaps corre-
lated with the deregulation of Intercontinental Exchange
(ICE) oil futures in US markets by the U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.
One last issue needs to be addressed: could the faster-
than-exponential price rises demonstrated here result
from a faster-than-exponential rise in demand which is
not met by supply? If the answer is positive, our inter-
pretation that we are seeing speculation unfolding would
be incorrect [20]. Could it indeed be that the recent
price surges are explained for instance by a faster-than-
exponential rise in demand from economies such as China
and India? The recent paper [21] by former President
Jiang Ze-Min himself debunks this hypothesis at least
for China (see Fig. 3 with caption in English in [21]).
To investigate this issue further, we took the values
on World liquid fuel supply and demand reported
by the International Energy Agency in its May,
13, 2008 Oil Market report [22] (see Table 1, p. 51)
and by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilother.html).
Figure 4 shows the World total liquid fuel demand and
total World supply, as estimated by these two agencies
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FIG. 4: Time series from 2004 to the first quarter of 2008 of
the World total liquid fuel demand and total World supply, as
estimated by two agencies, the International Energy Agency
(IEA) and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilother.html).
(IEA and EIA).
While the two agencies report approximately consis-
tent demand figures over this time period, there is a more
worrisome discrepancy between the supply values, with
the EIA reporting a supply value about one Mb/d smaller
than the IEA, since 2006. The EIA data suggests that
oil demand has exceeded supply over the last 5 quarters
shown here, suggesting that fundamentals play a major
role in the price run up. In contrast, the IEA data sug-
gests a much weaker effect. We tried to understand the
causes of these different values. For one, each of these es-
timated numbers aggregate global statistics coming from
many sources and countries. Second, there is also a de-
gree of extrapolation and guess work, which is handled
differently in the two agencies. There are often revisions
coming later (not unlike revision of GPD estimates in
macro-economics) that close the gap between these dif-
ferences. It seems to us that one message is that the
discrepancy between the EIA and IEA provides in fact a
measure of the estimation errors. In other words, these
numbers are not to be believed at face value given the
uncertainties.
Given these uncertainties, one feature seems to emerge
with a certain degree of certainty: until the end of 2005,
both agencies were in line and supply was systematically
exceeding demand. Since 2006, this deterministic fact
has broken down with the ushering into an epoch of un-
certainty. In our opinion, one should not conclude that
demand has exceeded supply or vice-versa since 2006,
but rather that the oil market has entered an opaque
regime. Rather than a clear transition to a supply re-
stricted regime, we interpret the discrepancy between
the IEA and EIA as a signature of uncertainty. Here,
we should immediately stress that there is no better fuel
than uncertainty to promote speculation!
In conclusion, the present study supports the hypoth-
esis that the recent oil price run-up, when expressed in
any of the major currencies, has been amplified by spec-
ulative behavior of the type found during a bubble-like
expansion. The underlying positive feedbacks, nucleated
by rumors of rising scarcity, may result from one or sev-
eral of the following factors acting together: (1) pro-
tective hedging against future oil price increases and a
weakening dollar whose anticipations amplify hedging in
a positive self-reinforcing loop; (2) search for a new high-
return investment, following the collapse of real-estate,
the securitization disaster and poor yields of equities,
whose expectations endorsed by a growing pool of hedge,
pension and sovereign funds will transform it in a self-
fulfilling prophecy; (3) the recent development since 2006
of deregulated oil future trading, allowing spot oil price
to be actually more and more determined by speculative
future markets [19] and thus more and more decoupled
from genuine supply-demand equilibrium.
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